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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
BACK SEAT DRIVING ENCOURAGED BY
THE SUPREME COURT
In these days of accelerated transportation by auto-
mobile it has become a colloquial expression to refer to one
as a "back seat driver" who advises the operator of an
automobile, while driving with him, of impending or pos-
sible danger resulting from speeding or carelessness.
In the usual case it has been observed that the aver-
age, normal driver receives the well-meant cautions and
remonstrances of the other occupants of the car with ill-
grace.
However, it is interesting to note that not only is it
sometimes the correct thing for the passenger to do, but it
is a duty imposed upon him by the courts of many states,
including those of Pennsylvania. It has been held in many
cases that where an injury occurs to a passenger as a result
of a collision between the car in which he is riding and
another object, he is guilty of contributory negligence and
cannot recover from the driver of the car for his neglig-
ence, if he failed in a proper case to warn the driver of the
car of the impending danger which the driver failed to
notice or was disregarding and the passenger, exercising
ordinary care, reasonably should have noticed. A late
Pennsylvania case which dogmatically laid down this rule
is Perry v. Ryback.1 The facts, briefly, were that the plain-
tiff's decedent was driving along the Roosevelt Boulevard
in the defendant's (Ryback's) automobile. It was raining
and Ryback was driving between 50 and 60 miles per hour
when he attempted to go around an "S" curve. The car
slid off the road, broke a telephone pole in half, turned
over and killed Perry. The defendant contended that his
negligence should be imputed to the deceased, since they
both were engaged in a common or joint enterprise. The
court held that each member of the joint enterprise was
charged with the use of ordinary care to avoid injury.
"Where the action is brought by one member of the enter-
prise against another, there is no place to apply the
1302 Pa. 559 (1930).
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doctrine of imputed negligence. * * * * it will be treated as
an ordinary action for injuries as the result of negligence."
"The owner of an automobile is liable to his guest or
passenger if he negligently operates his car to the injury
of his guest or passenger * * * * . It was the duty of the
deceased, when he noticed Ryback driving at the rate of
speed as here testified, to protest or warn him against it.
If he failed to perform this duty, he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence; the law would assume under such
circumstances that he was satisfied with the operation of
the car, and that he was willing to join Ryback in the
hazard or in taking a chance in the result of fast driving."
The court under the authority in Johnson v. Hetrick2
presumed that the "deceased used due care, that is, that he
did protest or remonstrate with Ryback as to his fast driv-
ing, but held that the presumption was rebuttable by un-
controvertable physical facts, that is, such facts as a court
will take judicial notice of."
The very able opinion in the Ryback Case' was written
by Justice Kephart and judgment rendered for the plain-
tiff in the absence of any evidence rebutting the presump-
tion that the deceased used ordinary care.
It may be inquired as to whether there is a duty upon
the passenger to be just as observant as the driver or
whether he can doze or read or pay no attention to the
road before them. A case decided last January5 held that
the passenger as an occupant was bound to exercise reas-
onable care for his own safety-but in the absence of any
proof to the contrary, such exercise of reasonable care
would be presumed. The reputation of the driver as a
careful operator of an automobile and the passenger's
knowledge of such reputation are matters relevant in
determining whether the guest should have been alert.
2300 Pa. 225 (1929).
8Patterson v. Pitts. Ry. Co., 210 Pa. 47 (1905); Unger v. P., B.
and W. R. R. Co., 217 Pa. 106 (1907); Hartig v. Ice Co., 290 Pa. 21,
30, 31 (1927).
4302 Pa. 559 (1930).
5Sinrill v. Eschenbach, 303 Pa. 156 (1931).
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A passenger is only required to act in the presence of
some threatened danger. The fact that she was dozing
when the crash came did not necessarily convict her of
negligence.
Where a passenger was reading a newspaper and
hence equally inattentive to the operation of the automo-
bile, the question of his contributory negligence was held
to be for the jury.6
In Asinger v. P. R. R. Co.T the Chief Justice says, "The
tendency of our decisions is to hold the passenger respon-
sible for his actual negligence in joining with the driver in
testing a danger he knows to exist, and not for the result
of mere inaction in failing to discover dangers of which he
was ignorant, but might have discovered had he been giv-
ing attention to the roadway ahead of them."
In the Ryback Case, supra, it was said "It was the duty
of the deceased, when he noticed Ryback driving at the rate
of speed as here testified, to protest or warn him against
it.,,-
From these opinions, therefore, we may fairly infer
that a passenger in a private automobile is not under the
same duty as the driver to watch the roadway ahead of
them; but he may occupy himself with other diversions,
depending on the skill of the driver to steer clear of harm
unless he is aware of the lack of skill of the driver. If be
observes any impending or threatened danger, in order to
relieve himself of being guilty of contributory negligence
he must remonstrate or warn the driver; and he is always
guilty of contributory negligence when he joins with the
driver "in testing the danger which he knows exists."
This is the law in Pennsylvania, wise or unwise. Wheth-
er it is wise or unwise depends largely on the temperament
of the driver of the vehicle in each particular case as well
as upon the excitable natures of passengers. Constant
warnings or remonstrances on the part of a passenger may
indirectly precipitate an accident, due to his erroneous and
unwarranted fears. Thus, the more the strain upon the
OKilpatrick v. P. R. T. Co., 290 Pa. 288 (1927).
7262 Pa. 242 (1918).
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driver's nervous system created by the passenger's contin-
uous outbursts and exclamations on account of his misap-
prehensions for fear of an accident, the less the likelihood
that the law will find him guilty of contributory negligence.
Of course in some cases such warnings are given quite
appropriately and, as a consequence, do prevent a collision;
but the courts, as shown above, in creating law by using
the yardstick of human natures, their tendencies and fail-
ihgs, as they always do, have decided that "back seat"
driving for reasons of policy in more to be encouraged
than prohibited.
There are cases admitting that sometimes it is better
for a passenger to say nothing than to warn the driver.
In Vocca v. Pa. R. R.' Justice Stewart approvingly cites
part of the opinion of Hermann v. R. I. Co." "It cannot be
said as a matter of law that such a guest or passenger is
guilty of negligence because he has done nothing. In
many such cases the right degree of caution may consist of
inaction. In situations of great and sudden peril, meddle-
some interference with those having control either by
physical acts or by disturbing suggestions and needless
warnings, may be exceedingly disastrous in results. While
it is the duty of such guest or passenger not to submit
himself and his safety solely to the prudence of the driver
of the vehicle, and that he must himself use ordinary care
for his own safety, nevertheless he should not in any case
be held guilty of contributory negligence merely because
he has done nothing." This opinion is followed in many
later decisions. 0
'259 Pa. 42 (1917).
936 R. 1. 447.
'0 Carbaugh v. Phila. and R. Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 27 (1918); Azinger
v. Pa. R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 251 (1918); Jerko v. Buffalo, R. and Pitts.
Ry. Co., 275 Pa. 462 (1923); Kilpatrick v. P. R. T. Co., 290 Pa. 21
(1927) ; Schlosstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 250 (1928) ; Simnrell v. Eschen-
back, 303 Pa. 156 (1931).
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Other states whose courts have held substantially as
our Supreme Court are Delaware, Iowa, Maryland,
Missouri, New York, Washington and Wisconsin.1'
HERBERT HORN.
CONTROL OF AUTOMOBILE WITHIN RANGE
OF HEADLIGHTS
The case of Simrell v. Eschenbach decided recently by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterates the now well
established Pennsylvania rule that a driver of a motor
vehicle must have it under such control as to be able to
stop within the range of its headlights.
In this case the facts show that the defendant's truck
was standing on the right side of the Lackawanna Trail
at four o'clock A. M. There was no red light or other
warning on the rear of the truck. Doctor Simrell drove
his car in which his wife was a passenger in such a man-
ner as to collide with the rear end of the truck. Although
there was a moon, the early morning was dark and cloudy.
On the stand the doctor testified that he could see the truck
only when within twenty feet of it and not in time to stop
or turn aside, since he was travelling at a speed of about
twenty-five or thirty miles per hour. The court held the
doctor guilty of contributory negligence, thus defeating
his right of recovery but not that of his wife. In the words
of Mr. Justice Walling "one reason urged for his inability
to have a longer range of vision was a bend in the road
south of the point of accident; but after passing this he
had a straight range for over sixty feet before coming to
the truck."
'2
"Poynter v. Townsend, 130 A. 678 (Dela.) (1924); Hubbard v.
0artholemew, 163 Iowa 58, 144 N. W. 13 (1913); Lavine v. Abram-
son, 142 Md. 222, 120 A. 523 (1923); Irwin v. McDougal, 217 Mo. App.
645, 274 S. W. 923 (1925); Klauber v. Jackson, 209 N. Y. S. 209
(1925); Bauer v. Tongaw, 128 Wash. 654, 224 P. 20 (1924); Howe v.
Carey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N. W. 791 (1920).
1303 Pa. 156, 154 Atl. 369 (1931).
2Ibid. p. 159,
